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Abstract
Black and Cox (1976) claim that the value of junior debt is increasing in asset risk
when the firm’s value is low. We show, using closed-form solution, that the junior debt’s
value is hump-shaped. This has interesting implications for the market-discipline role
of banks’ subdebt.
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1 Introduction
Over the past few decades the size and complexity of financial institutions has increased to an
extent that challenges regulators’ ability to monitor them. Many proposals suggest greater
reliance on junior debt or subordinated debt (hereafter, subdebt) as a tool to discipline
banks’ risk-taking.1 It is argued that the negative effect of excessive risk-taking on subdebt
price encourages subdebtholders to monitor banks closely in a way that is aligned with the
deposit insurer’s incentive (Flannery, 2001). Moreover, a change in the subdebt price can
signal a change in the bank’s risk, allowing the regulator and other market participants to
discipline the bank (Evanoff and Wall, 2001; Dewatripont and Tirole, 1993)
The 2007–2009 financial crisis put into question the effectiveness of subdebt as a moni-
toring tool. Calomiris and Herring (2013) claim that subdebt was ineffective in mitigating
excessive risk due to subdebtholders’ lack of motivation to monitor banks’ asset risk. In-
tuitively, when a bank is in financial distress, the only way its subdebtholders can be paid
is by winning a large and risky bet; hence, the risk preferences of subdebtholders become
more like those of shareholders. The risk preferences of the junior debt holders has been
analyzed theoretically in Black and Cox (1976) (and further developed in Gorton and San-
tomero, 1990), using the contingent claim approach for pricing corporate liabilities (Merton,
1974). They show that the value of a firm’s junior debt can be expressed as a “bull spread”
position, which is composed of a long call option on the firm’s asset with a strike price equal
to the face value of the senior debt and a short call option with a strike equal to the total
debt of the firm. Specifically, Black and Cox (1976, p. 369) claim that when the firm’s asset
value is below a certain threshold (the discounted geometric mean of the face value of the
deposits and the total debt), then the value of subdebt is an increasing function of asset risk,
since subdebt is then effectively the residual claimant (see also a similar claim in Gorton and
Santomero, 1990, p. 122).
In this note, we clarify and extend the above claim. We use a closed-form solution
(as in Black and Cox, 1976) to show that when the firm’s value is below the threshold
mentioned above, the relationship between the subdebt value and the asset risk is hump-
shaped (rather than increasing with asset risk), and to characterize an interior level of risk
1Another important tool for decreasing bank stock holders’ risk taking motivation debated heavily in
recent literature is contingent capital (CoCo). For examples of analysis of CoCo’s effect on risk taking
motivation see Martynova and Perotti (2018) and Hilscher and Raviv (2014).
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that maximizes the value of subdebt.2 The revised analysis can have important implications
for the expected effect of subdebt on the risk-taking of financial institutions in time of
distress. Specifically, the subdebtholders will not be motivated to increase risk as much as
possible (which is the stockholders’s motivation); rather, they will be motivated to increase
risk to some intermediate level. Thus, if the subdebtholders can affect risk-shifting, then
they will choose a moderate level of risk and risk-shifting will be limited to the level that
maximizes the value of the subdebt.3 Moreover, we show that the level of asset risk that
maximizes the value of the subdebt is an increasing function of the firm’s leverage and of
the proportion of the senior debt out of the firm’s total debt.
Our analysis can explain the empirical results in Ashcraft (2008), which documents that
an increase in the amount of subdebt in regulatory capital has a positive effect in helping
a bank recover from financial distress. Others also document that including subdebt in a
bank’s capital reduced risk-shifting during the crisis period (Nguyen, 2013; John, Mehran,
and Qian, 2010; Belkhir, 2013; Chen and Hasan, 2011).
2 Analysis
We use the expanded contingent claims valuation model derived by Black and Cox (1976)
to encompass the case of multiple debt claims (junior and senior). Our model and notations
closely follow Gorton and Santomero (1990).
2.1 Valuation
We begin by describing the firm’s liability structure and expressing the values of the different
claims.
A firm is funded by stock with market value S, and two types of debt with different
priorities as claimants, such that at debt maturity the junior debt is repaid only after the
senior debt is repaid in full. Both loans are zero-coupon loans maturing at time T . The senior
2We present a closed-form solution to the sensitivity of a bull spread option strategy to asset risk in
Peleg Lazar and Raviv (2017) and Peleg Lazar and Raviv (2019). However, the focus in that paper is on the
sensitivity of the bank’s stock to asset risk when bank assets are a risky debt claim.
3The question whether and to what extent subdebtholders can affect the choice of asset risk is a separate
question that is beyond the scope of this paper. In Heller, Peleg Lazar, and Raviv (2019) we apply a
game-theoretic bargaining analysis to study the equilibrium risk induced by joint control of the bank by
shareholders and subdebtholders.
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loan’s face value is FS and its market value is BS and the junior debt’s face value is FJ and its
market value is BJ . The value of the firm’s assets, V , follows a geometric Brownian motion
under the risk-neutral measure according to the following equation: dVt = r·Vt ·dt+σ·Vt ·dW ,
where r is the instantaneous risk-free rate of return, σ is the instantaneous volatility of asset
value, and dW is a standard Wiener process under the risk-neutral probability measure.
If at debt maturity the value of the firm’s assets is greater than the sum of the face
values of all its debt, FS + FJ , then both debtholders are repaid in full and equityholders
receive the residual. By contrast, if the firm’s asset value at maturity is below the sum of
the face values of all its debt, but above the face value of the senior debt, FS < V < FS +FJ ,
then the senior debt is repaid in full and the junior debtholders are the residual claimants
(equityholders do not receive any payoff). Otherwise, if the firm’s asset value is below the
face value of the senior debt, V < FS, the senior debtholders receive all the asset value and
the junior debtholders and equityholdesr are not repaid at all.
Hence, the senior debtholders’ payoff at maturity is the minimum between the firm’s
asset value and the face value of their debt: BS,T = min{VT , FS}. This expression can be
rearranged and expressed as BS,T = FS −max{FS − VT , 0}. As discussed in Merton (1974),
this payoff is equivalent to the payoff of a risk-free debt with face value FS and a short
position in a European put option. Therefore, the present value of the senior debt is
BS,t = FS · e−r(T−t) − Putt(Vt, FS, σ, T − t, r),
where Putt(Vt, FS, σ, T − t, r) is the value of a European put option on the firm’s asset value
at time t, with a strike price equal to the face value of senior debt FS, asset risk σ, and time
to maturity T − t. Under the above described geometric Brownian motion, the value of the
option can be found using the Black and Scholes (1973) equation.
The junior debt’s payoff at maturity is the minimum between the value of assets left after
repaying the senior debt, if any, and the face value of the junior debt min{VT − FS, FJ}, as
long as the payoff is nonnegative, i.e., BJ,T = max{min{VT − FS, FJ}, 0}. This payoff can
be rearranged and expressed as BJ,T = max{VT −FS, 0}−max{VT − (FS +FJ), 0}, which is
equivalent to a long position in a European call option with a strike price equal to the face
value of the senior debt, FS, and a short position in a European call option with a strike
price equal to the sum of the face values of all of the firm’s debt, FS + FJ . Therefore, the
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value of the junior debt prior to maturity is
BJ,t = Callt(Vt, FS, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(Vt, FS + FJ , σ, T − t, r), (1)
where Callt(Vt, ·, σ, T − t, r) is the value of a European call option according to the Black
and Scholes (1973) equation.
The stock’s payoff at debt maturity is ST = max{VT − (FS +FJ), 0}. This payoff can be
replicated by a European call option on the value of the firm’s assets, with a strike price equal
to the sum of the face values of all the firm’s debt (Galai and Masulis, 1976). Therefore, the
value of stock at time t is
St = Callt(Vt, FS + FJ , σ, T − t, r).
The value of the firm’s assets and the payoff to each of its claimholders at debt maturity is
presented in Figure ??.
2.2 Junior Debtholder’s Asset Risk Preferences
As pointed out by Gorton and Santomero (1990, p. 122), “If the promised payment of
the senior debt is close to the value of the firm, then junior debt is effectively the residual
claimant and will behave like an equity claim. If, however, the value of the firm is significantly
higher than the promised payment on the senior debt, then the junior debt will behave like
debt.” More precisely, the sensitivity of the value of junior debt to the level of asset risk is
divided into two segments defined by the threshold (Black and Cox, 1976, Eq. 10; Gorton
and Santomero, 1990, Eq. 7):
Vˆ ≡ e−
(
r+σ
2
2
)
(T−t)√
FS · (FS + FJ), (2)
which is a function of the geometric mean of the face value of senior debt and the sum of the
face values of all of the firm’s debt. Black and Cox (1976, p. 360) conclude that “Analysis
of the function shows J [the bond’s value] is an increasing (decreasing) function of σ2 for V
less than (greater than) Vˆ .”
We clarify this statement by noting that when the value of the borrower’s assets is below
this threshold, the relationship between the market value of the subdebt claim and asset risk
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is hump-shaped, and the maximum value of the subdebt claim is reached at the level of asset
risk defined as follows (the proof is presented in the Appendix):
σmax ≡ arg max
σ
BJ,t(σ) =
√
1
T − t ln
(
FS · (FS + FJ)
V 2t
)
− 2r, (3)
if V ≤ V ∗ ≡ e−r·(T−t)√FS · (FS + FJ); otherwise there is no internal solution and σmax = 0.
The level of asset risk that maximizes the value of the junior debt, σmax, is an increasing
function of the firm’s leverage (FS +FJ to V ) and the ratio of senior debt to asset value (FS
to V ).
The following result summarizes the above analysis of the value of the bank stock as a
function of the asset’s risk.4
Proposition 1. The value of the junior debt is (1) decreasing with asset risk if Vt > V
∗
and (2) hump-shaped (unimodal) in asset risk if Vt < V
∗, and, in this case, its maximum is
obtained for risk level σmax. Moreover, the risk level that maximizes the value of junior debt
is higher than the initial risk (i.e., σmax > σ0) if and only if Vt < Vˆ .
The proposition is demonstrated in Figure 1. In panel (a) the value of assets is above
both Vˆ and V ∗ and the value of junior debt is decreasing with asset risk. By contrast, in
panel (b) the value of junior debt is hump-shaped with respect to asset risk and achieves its
maximum value when asset risk equals σmax = 26.2%.
The effect of the proportion of junior debt We find that both the range of asset
values where risk-shifting takes place and the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of
junior debt decrease with the proportion of junior debt. To see this, note that both Vˆ (Eq.
2) and σmax (Eq. 3) decrease when the face value of junior debt FJ increases while the sum
of the face values of the total debt FS+FJ remains unchanged (where an increase in FJ while
keeping FS +FJ unchanged implies a decrease in FS). This result is demonstrated in Figure
2, where the sum of the face values of the total debt is constant and equal to FS +FJ = 100
while the face value of the junior debt changes.
4 Under the assumption of continuous dividends, qVtdt, we find that the both the threshold under which
risk shifting takes place and the optimal level of risk when risk shifting takes place are slightly higher and
equal Vˆ ≡ e−
(
r−q+σ22
)
(T−t)√
FS · (FS + FJ) and σmax ≡
√
1
T−t ln
(
FS ·(FS+FJ )
V 2t
)
− 2r + 2q.
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(a) Asset value: V = 100
(b) Asset value: V = 62
Figure 1: The value of junior debt as a function of the level of asset risk. The face value of the
senior debt is FS = 60 and the face value of the junior debt is FJ = 10. In addition, the time to maturity is
one year and the risk-free rate is r = 1%. Given these values, Vˆ = 63.8.
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Figure 2: The level of asset risk that maximizes the value of junior debt for different propor-
tions of junior debt. The figure depicts the equilibrium level of asset risk chosen by the junior debtholders.
The different lines (ranging from 10% to 30%) correspond to different proportions of junior debt out of the
total debt. The sum of the face values of both the senior debt and the junior debt is fixed at FS +FJ = 100.
The initial level of asset risk is σ0 = 10%. In addition, the time to maturity is one year and the risk-free
rate is r = 1%.
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Appendix A: Proofs
The value of junior debt (Eq. 1) is equivalent to a portfolio of two call options on the value
of the firm’s assets BJ,t = Callt(Vt, FS, σ, T − t, r)− Callt(Vt, FS + FJ , σ, T − t, r).
To find the level of asset risk that maximizes the value of junior debt we calculate the
derivative of the value of junior debt with respect to asset risk. Since it is well known that
∂Callt
∂σ
=
√
T√
2pi
· V · e− 12 ·(d1(Fi))2 ,
where d1(fi) =
1
σ
√
T−t ·
[
ln
(
Vt
Fi
)
+
(
r + 1
2
σ2
) · (T − t)], we get
∂BJ,t
∂σ
=
√
T√
2pi
· V · e− 12 ·(d1(FS))2 −
√
T√
2pi
· V · e− 12 ·(d1(FS+FJ ))2 .
After rearranging it can be shown that the derivative equals
∂BJ,t
∂σ
=
√
T − t√
2pi
· Vt · e−
1
2·T ·σ2
[
ea − eb] ,
where a and b are defined as
a = −2 · lnVt · lnFS + (ln(FS))2 − 2 · ln (FS) ·
(
r +
σ2
2
)
· (T − t)
b = −2 · lnVt · lnFS + FJ + (ln(FS + FJ))2 − 2 · ln (FS + FJ) ·
(
r +
σ2
2
)
· (T − t).
The payoff is maximized with respect to asset risk in cases where the first derivative
equals zero. This happens when either VC,t = 0 or a = b. Since the first option is of no
interest economically we focus on the second option. We find that a = b when
Vt = e
−(r+ 12σ2)·(T−t) ·
√
FS · (FS + FJ), (A.1)
Based on Equation A.1, we define Vˆ as the borrower’s asset value for which the claim’s value
is maximized given a level of asset risk σ. This threshold is identical to the one found in
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Black and Cox (1976, Eq. 10) and Gorton and Santomero (1990, Eq. 7). We also note that
the derivative changes its sign from positive to negative above the threshold, Vˆ , meaning
that the bank’s claimholder would like to increase risk below that level and to decrease it
above that level of assets.
Next, fixing the level of assets, we find that a = b when
σ =
√
1
T − t ln
(
FS · (FS + FJ)
(Vt)
2
)
− 2r. (A.2)
However, for both Equations A.1 and A.2 to hold, that is, for an internal solution to
exist, the firm’s asset value must be below V ∗ defined as V ∗ ≡ e−r·(T−t)√FS · (FS + FJ).
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